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Abstract: In the section ‘Jesus Christ, Lord of Time’ in Church Dogmatics III/2 
Karl Barth held that lordship or sovereignty over time was central to the 
reality of the risen Jesus. I argue that his enacting sovereignty over time 
coincided with the very resurrection of time itself - the past recapitulated in 
the present – in a way necessarily involving the conceptuality of absolute or 
numerical identity rather than mere generic or sortal sameness.   
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As Karl Barth has it, neither scripture-fulfilment nor kyriocentric vision is 
central to the Gospels’ understanding of the significance of the risen Jesus’ 
resurrection appearances. In particular, as regards a certain kind of 
theophanic presence or vision, the central thematic is not a ‘new and glorified 
corporeality in which Jesus appeared to His disciples.’1 The ‘main theme and 
significance’ is not ‘the inauguration of the second creation, the new æon ….’2 
Barth continues: 
Is it not surprising that if we really wished we could find more along 
these lines in the story of the transfiguration than in the records of 
Easter, which mention the white ( Mk. 165) or even "shining" ( Lk. 244) 
raiment of the angels, but have no great interest in the new form of 
Jesus as such?3   
                                                          
1 Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, tr. G Bromiley (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1953), 
145. 
2 Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 145. 
3 Barth continues: ‘If we want information on the latter point we have to look 
for it, drawing deductions (as from the appearances through closed doors), 
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In the very place where one would expect a transfigured Jesus, there is none – 
no indication that Jesus’ appearance is of another form, angelic, shining, or 
otherwise. As Barth would have it, there is not even such a presence in John’s 
intention to speak of the divinity of Jesus at 20:28: nothing there resembles 
any theophanic presence or vision of YHWH in the Old Testament. Instead, 
according to Barth there is a startling claim about Jesus’ sovereignty over 
time. I believe Barth was right about this as regards the Gospels and indeed I 
hold that sovereignty over time is to be found there because of Genesis 1:3-5’s 
claim that the first thing YHWH (God) created was time.4 But my intention in 
this essay is to explore the sense in which it can be said that Barth’s notion of 
lordship or sovereignty over time in Church Dogmatics III/2 necessarily 
involves the concept of numerical identity.5 Is there evidence there that this is 
how he ought to be understood? I answer, yes, and hold that Barth was a 
pioneer on this matter. He saw that insofar as sovereignty over time involves 
any notion of identity it must be numerical identity. Central to his explanation 
of the significance of the resurrection appearances is the absolute 
recapitulation of the past in some such respect. This is not merely referencing 
his well-known view of the simultaneity of the past, present and future in the 
risen Jesus but rather pointing in some sense to the action of the resurrection of 
                                                          
and therefore answering questions which are not posed in this context by the 
Evangelists themselves’ (Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 145). 
4 Here I affirm Claus Westermann’s view in his commentary on Genesis, 
Westermann, Genesis 1-11 tr. John Scullion (Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1985), 
112-122. It is pre-eminently to Westermann’s magisterial commentary on 
Genesis that we owe the insight that in the beginning the first two things 
YHWH created were time and space. Westermann attributes the intentionality 
of the action of the creation of time to Genesis 1:3-5 and the intentionality of 
the creation of space to 1:6-10. Pre-eminently YHWH is Elohim because he is the 
creator of the very dimensions in which the world has its life: YHWH is ha Elohim – 
the greatest god and therefore God (Elohim as a proper name as used in 
Genesis 1) - because he is the creator of time and indeed of space. The Priestly 
writer then proceeds in his narrative to fill up the dimensions of time and 
space with events and objects. In this sense it can be understood as a kind of 
‘container’ universe not too far removed from the way Isaac Newton 
understood the relationship between, on the one hand, space and time and, 
on the other, objects and events). Space and time are the absolute ‘forms’ of 
the creation, they are not as Gottfried Leibniz held second-order functions of 
events and objects, far less a kind of necessary a ‘priori synthetic’ filter for the 
human mind to perceive truths about the fundamental particulars of the 
world (as Kant thought). 




the past, of time itself. I begin my account on a personal note of how I came to 
view Barth in this way. 
 
CHURCH DOGMATICS III/2: THE EVIDENCE 
 
There is a passage in Barth’s Church Dogmatics to which I have often turned 
when seeking insight into the resurrection narratives. The passage is in the 
form of an excursus found in volume IV/2, pages 144-6. On the particular 
occasion of having begun to wonder about sovereignty over time and 
numerical identity I sought inspiration on precisely how ‘numerical identity’ 
could be present in the actions of the risen Jesus. Previously, my 
interpretation of Barth on the moment of Jesus’ self-revelation to the disciples 
in this excursus had been resolutely ‘generic’ in nature: I had taken the 
reference to what I now interpret as identical action to be generically the same 
action - as in doing the same (exact species of) action (as in ‘he raised his arm 
in exactly the same way five times’). Even though I was cognizant of Barth’s 
view in Church Dogmatics III/2 of the risen Jesus as in some sense uniting past, 
present and future in his person – a species of absolute unity of time based on 
biblical passages such as ‘I am the one who is, who was, and is to come (cf. 
Revelation 1:4, 8)6 this did not stop me from thinking in terms of generic 
                                                          
6 Barth introduces his understanding of Jesus’ lordship over Time in Church 
Dogmatics III/2 in terms of the contrast between the human reality of time - 
time as ‘succession’ – and ‘God’s eternity’ understood as the ‘simultaneity of 
present, past and future’ (Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, 438. Subsequently he 
proceeds to the material that constitutes the biblical basis of this view. Central 
to this is Rev. 1:8: 
Of all the relevant passages in the Apocalypse, the clearest is Rev. 18: "I 
am the Alpha and the Omega, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, 
and which is to come, the Almighty" (παντοκράτωρ). The context 
leaves us in no doubt that the speaker is not God in abstracto, but 
God in concreto, God in His identity with the man Jesus (Barth, Church 
Dogmatics III/2, 465). 
Barth understands this to involve a divine temporality where past, present, 
and future constitute an absolute unity of time: 
[Jesus] ascribes to Himself a being in time. The same truth emerges 
unmistakeably from the allusion to the three dimensions, the second 
dimension being significantly placed first in verse 8: "which is, and 
which was, and which is to come." His life embraces a present, past 
and future. Here is no timeless being, but a strictly temporal one, 
though of course it differs from all other temporal being as that which 




sameness when I read IV/2. This is for example how I interpreted what Barth 
said of Mary Magdalene’s recognition of the risen Jesus. She ‘recognises Him 
simply by the fact that - obviously not for the first time - He calls her by her 
name (Jn. 2016) (Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 145). It made sense to say that 
generically the same action reminded Mary of Jesus and prompted her 
recognition of him in an event that could therefore in principle be explained 
naturalistically. The passage is certainly consistent with this assertion but of 
course as I will claim it is not the only explanation. It did not in fact occur to 
me then that Barth could mean something akin to numerical identity and that 
this would involve the miracle of Jesus enacting sovereignty over time as in 
resurrecting the identical but past action.  
Likewise, when Barth spoke about the overall significance of the 
resurrection appearances he appeared at least to me to mean what I now 
understand to be the concept of sortal sameness or continuity of identity 
through time as thoroughly endorsed by the classical tradition. That is how I 
understood the following:  
the question how [the disciples] came to recognise Him when they saw 
and heard Him is rather strangely answered - although not with equal 
definiteness - by the radical assertion that He was known as the One 
                                                          
That is to say, I am sovereign over my own being. Even as present I am 
He who was and will be. All this is applied to the being of the man 
Jesus in time. The all-inclusive "I am" rules out any notion that the 
three dimensions, present, past and future, simply follow one another 
in succession. The very fact that 18 puts the "I am" and the "which is" 
first is a plain warning. It means: "I am all this simultaneously. I, the 
same, am; I was as the same; and I will come again as the same. My 
time is always simultaneously present, past and future. That is why I 
am the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first and 
the last. Since my present includes the past and future it is both the first 
and last of all other times.’ (Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, 465). 
Barth offers the same kind of commentary on Hebrews 13:8 (Barth, Church  
Dogmatics III/2, 466). My analysis of the form and direction of Barth’s exegesis 
in Church Dogmatics III/2, 465-474 leads me to believe that Barth took passages 
such as Revelation 1:8 to constitute commentary on the risen Jesus’ action 
attested in the Gospels inclusive of the action of self-revelation. To that extent 
he understood their truth at least in part ultimately derivable from the actual 
historical reality of the actions of the risen Jesus involving as they do the 
recapitulation of the past. The qualification is added because I think that the 
temporal dimension of the future does not play the same role as the other two 
in Barth’s account of sovereignty of time as enacted by the risen Jesus in his 
appearances. I would not want to say it is completely absent but it is less 
emphatic, less explicit, and to this extent less central.  
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who had been among them before and was then crucified, dead and 
buried (Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 145).7   
It was also what I read into this passage: 
What the Evangelists really know and say is simply that the disciples 
saw and heard Jesus again after His death, and that as they saw and 
heard Him they recognised Him, and that they recognised Him on the 
basis of His identity with the One whom they had known before. And 
they say this because it seems to be their particular intention to say it 
(Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 145). 
Accordingly, to my way of thinking there was nothing in IV/2 that implied 
the risen Jesus recapitulating an action absolutely identical with an action of 
his in the past or indeed revealing himself to be the recapitulation of a Jesus 
absolutely identical with the Jesus of the past. There was nothing in these 
passages that appeared to intimate the very resurrection of time, and of time 
past (or time ‘before’) in particular.8 As I say, it was only when I read the 
excursus in terms of sovereignty over time and this in terms of numerical 
identity that I wondered whether this was indeed what Barth himself had 
meant. I tested what was only a hypothesis by examining those passages in 
‘Jesus Christ, Lord of Time’ in Church Dogmatics III/2 where Barth focussed on 
the risen Jesus actions in the Gospels and, to my great surprise, when I read 
Barth’s exegesis of the Emmaus narrative in Luke 24 the following set of 
statements leapt out at me. I had read them before but by comparison had 
‘barely blinked’ then chiefly because I took them to be referring to generic 
sameness and sortal sameness. But now I could see that neither of these 
                                                          
7 I have wondered whether the qualification Barth makes here is significant. 
Why should the answer be ‘strange’ as in ‘remarkable’ (merkwürdige; Barth, 
Kirchliche Dogmatik IV/2 [Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1960], 162)? It might 
be because Barth was making a claim regarding the strange presence of 
numerical identity rather than mere sortal or generic sameness. Barth may be 
making good his claim that the way in which he understood Luke’s Emmaus 
narrative – Jesus’ lordship over time - was the interpretative lens through 
which he viewed the other appearance narratives. In other words, he had in 
mind numerical identity and not generic or sortal sameness.  
8  A human being who merely raises their arm twice generically cannot be said 
to enact sovereignty over time since they are not enacting the identical first 
raising of their arm; they are only ‘copying’ it; they are not resurrecting the 
identical action.  A human being who merely exhibits sortal sameness in the 
resurrection of the body rather than conforming to absolute identity in some 
sense cannot be said to enact the resurrection of time (though Jesus’ 
resurrection understood sortally would I contend manifest sovereignty over a 
specific physical object, namely Jesus’ own body). By analogy: it had not 
occurred to me that Barth could be thinking in any other way about Jesus. 
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concepts did Barth justice. Before I present these passages and explain why I 
thought such concepts do not do his thought justice I should explain my 
terms, and in particular explain why numerical identity is literally in a class of 
its own. It means in effect explaining the distinction between identity and 
sameness. The latter concept breaks down into generic sameness and sortal 




IDENTITY, GENERIC SAMENESS, AND SORTAL SAMENESS 
 
The tendency is to use ‘identity’ and ‘sameness’ synonymously. We must 
insist on keeping them separate. We must discriminate between: speaking 
about sameness under a sortal concept9 e.g. being the same man or being the 
same boat or being the same body10; speaking about generic sameness as in 
doing the same action repetitively; and speaking about strict and absolute 
identity of the kind that satisfies the principle of the indiscernibility of 
identicals, what one might call the simple uncluttered notion of identity.  In 
the influential essay ‘Possibility Relative to a Sortal‘11 the philosopher Delia 
Graff Fara unpacks the various distinctions that must be made between 
identity and sameness. In doing this she hopes to isolate a very precise notion 
of identity which is so ‘absolute’ and ‘too unyielding a relation’ that it does 
                                                          
9 A term introduced into the philosopher’s vocabulary by John Locke in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1690 to indicate what the essence of 
a thing is, sortal sameness in the context of the present essay is used to refer to 
continuity and persistence and sameness of an object through time. It is 
therefore designates a conceptuality existing intermediately between on the 
one hand mere generic sameness and on the other absolute identity. 
10 Harold Noonan’s paper ‘On the Notion of a Sortal Concept’ brilliantly 
captures all the ingredients essential to the articulation of this issue. See H W 
Noonan, ‘On the Notion of a Sortal Concept’, Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110) 
1978, 58-64. He argued that what he called identity under a sortal concept e.g. 
being the same man or being the same boat is not to be understood as the strict 
unyielding notion of identity. This is because it does not satisfy the principle 
of indiscernibility of identicals. As we will see, Delia Graff Fara advises that 
we should retain the concept of identity only for the latter and the former 
should be referred to as sameness under a sortal concept. There is on the one 
hand the unyielding because absolute concept of identity and on the other 
there is sameness under a sortal concept.   
11 Delia Graff Fara, ‘Possibility Relative to a Sortal’, Karen Bennett and Dean 




not even apply to the sameness and continuity of an object through time, a 
sortal concept e.g. being the same boat or the same human being, far less what 
we understand as generic sameness. She writes: 
There is a distinction between identity and sameness. There is only one 
identity relation but there are many sameness relations. As many have 
said, identity is that relation which everything bears to itself but to no 
other thing. But something may be the same, in a number of different 
respects, as something other than itself. Sameness relations fall under 
at least two categories. First, there are those that are relativized to a 
quality—e.g., same color or same height. Second, there are those that are 
relativized to a sort of thing—e.g., same person or same boat (Graff Fara, 
‘Possibility Relative to a Sortal’, 3). 
The first category is relatively unproblematic: there are degrees of generic 
sameness culminating in the ‘special case of sameness relativized to a quality: 
sameness with respect to every quality.’(Graff Fara, ‘Possibility Relative to a 
Sortal’, 3). Things belong to the same class or set such that there is more than 
one example of the same thing or quality. Another name for this is qualitative 
sameness. 
The second category is sameness relative to a sort (e.g. the same person 
or same boat). This is the concept of sameness that Graff Fara is most 
determined to distinguish from numerical or absolute identity. It happens to 
be the one that, as we will see, looms large in discussion of the risen Jesus in 
the classical tradition under the concept of continuity of sameness leading to 
this simplistic notion of Jesus living on in continuity with his past self in some 
sense. She writes: 
… the boat that Michael just embarked on is the same boat as the one 
he will later row ashore (should all go as planned), even though the 
boat that he embarked on is not absolutely identical to the boat that he 
will row ashore. Like Theseus’s ship, Michael’s boat will have 
exchanged or lost some of its parts over the course of its long river 
crossing. This suffices to make the embarked-upon boat numerically 
distinct from the rowed-ashore boat. But it does not suffice to make 
them different boats (Graff Fara, ‘Possibility Relative to a Sortal’, 5).12 
She concludes: 
                                                          
12 ‘[I]f Michael does not in the end row his boat ashore because it capsizes, 
then the boat that he would have rowed ashore—if only his boat had not 
capsized—would be the same boat as the one he in fact embarked on, even 
though the boat that he would have rowed ashore in that event would not be 
absolutely identical to the boat he did in fact embark on.’ (Graff Fara, 




The boat we’re on now is the very same boat as the one we were on last 
week. But they are not identical, for identity is “too unyielding a 
relation” (to borrow Robert Stalnaker’s words) to hold of entities 
composed of different matter (Graff Fara, ‘Possibility Relative to a 
Sortal’, 6). 
So the boat in question is the same boat but not identical to the boat Michael 
embarked on because it will not have numerically the same properties. It will 
as she says be composed of different matter. We should be more radical than 
Graff Fara on this point though I endorse all the distinctions she makes. I 
would hold the boat would not be the identical boat even if it were able to 
persist in the exactly the same way such that it wasn’t composed of different 
matter. Identity requires that the boat rowed ashore can only be the boat 
embarked on if it were identical to the boat embarked on, which is to say, if it 
were the boat embarked on. But not only would the boat embarked on and the 
boat rowed ashore differ in terms of duration of existence – perdurance - even if 
its material properties did not depreciate, age, or change in time in any way; it 
would also differ in terms of time of existence. Both these must hold in order 
for absolute identity to apply. 
 
BARTH ON JESUS’ LORDSHIP OVER TIME 
 
My terms duly elucidated, why do the concepts of generic sameness and 
sortal sameness not do justice to Barth? Here is Barth’s interpretation of the 
denouement of the Emmaus narrative, Jesus breaking bread as Luke 24:30-31 
has it: 
 Not until He performed a certain action was this state of affairs changed 
("And their eyes were opened, and they knew him," v. 31). That action was 
not something new and special, but the very action He had performed on the 
night of His passion when He re-interpreted the Passover as a 
prefigurement of His own passion and death in their saving 
significance, thus showing that the deliverance of Israel from Egypt 
had now become a reality (Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, 472; my italics). 
Now, I grant you one could conceivably read this to mean mere generic 
sameness in the context of sortal sameness (the same Jesus continuing in 
time). But neither generic sameness nor sortal sameness permits one to write 
the following: 
The limitation of the past had been burst. The past of Jesus had become a 
present reality (Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, 472; my italics). 
Or this: 
… it was this Jesus who encountered them in the Easter time, emerging 
from the past as a figure of the present, alive for evermore, abiding with 
them, their Lord and Contemporary for all time. It was He and none 
other, in the form which belonged to the past, who must now be 
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manifested to them as the content of the Gospel (Barth, Church 
Dogmatics III/2, 473; my italics). 
Or this: 
… this figure of the past whose abiding presence [i.e., being present] is 
guaranteed by the event of Easter (Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, 473; 
my italics). 
Or this: 
Jesus the Lord whom he proclaims is identical with that figure of the past 
who has made Himself eternally present as the Lord in the Easter time 
(Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, 473; my italics).13 
Or this: 
And in the light of the Easter time the two different times are made one 
time in which the present is filled by the past of Jesus, because this past has not 
remained the past but irrupted into the present …(Barth, Church Dogmatics 
III/2,  473; my italics). 
 ‘The past has not remained past but irrupted into the present’: this is central 
to Barth. The insight informs everything he says above. The past irrupts into 
the present such that ‘two different times are made one time.’ The past irrupts 
into the present such that the ‘limitation of the past had been burst. The past 
of Jesus had become a present reality.’ The past irrupts into the present such 
that Jesus is present ‘in the form which belonged to the past.’ With hindsight 
it is perfectly explicable that neither generic sameness nor sortal sameness 
would figure in Barth’s thought. Neither of them deliver sovereignty over 
time. The core reason is that neither are about the resurrection of time itself:  
generic sameness cannot but testify to the loss of time; the persistence 
characterizing sortal sameness indicates survival of the object or agent but not 
the resurrection of time. It is clear that generic sameness does not permit the 
past to irrupt into the present ‘to become a present reality’, it only copies the 
past without recapitulating absolute identity. Likewise sortal sameness may 
in some sense carry the past into the present and into the future but this is 
emphatically not a matter of the unyielding notion of identity. With these 
distinctions to mind, we see that what Barth had to say about the risen Jesus 
and his actions correspond to numerical or absolute identity. 
How does the irruption of the past into the present happen? The best 
answer is that the risen Jesus enacts this reality. Beyond this there may be 
nothing more logically primitive to say. It may be helpful to think of Jesus’ 
lordship over time in terms of the mechanics of film-editing. By this I mean 
                                                          
13 I concede the reference here to Jesus’ eternal presence subsuming the 
category of future but I continue to think that this is more mere assertion than 
a proposition based on his actual expression of his understanding of what is 
central to the risen Jesus’ enactment of sovereignty over time. For more on 
this see footnote 6 above. 
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something like Jesus re-orders time, manipulates time - superimposes one 
time on another -  as a film-maker might when he or she cuts and pastes 
celluloid film. In other words, Jesus does to time - and therefore to the reality 
it encompasses or contains – what the film-maker does to celluloid film. To be 
sure, the analogy of Jesus as a divine film-maker cannot do justice to the 
reality; it is rather that Jesus is able to do to the fabric of time what a film-
maker is able to do to the fabric of film. But of course time is not a fabric like 
celluloid film; so it is the very fact that Jesus can ‘cut and paste’ something as 
evanescent as time that is the true miracle. 
 
A PARADOX RESOLVED 
Divine temporality understood in terms of the simultaneity of present, past, 
and future does not of itself imply that there would be actions in history 
recapitulating an identical feature of the past. For the two realms need not 
ever have come into contact with each other. This may mean that the latter 
entails the former at least in part but the converse does not hold true. Thus 
one could hold the former without entertaining the latter. There is a reason 
one might be grateful for this. It could be argued that Barth meant the 
impossible. We might object that the resurrection of time in this sense does 
not quite meet the strict conditions of absolute identity. How could it? Surely 
the fact that it was enacted at a time in the past, in the before, means that it 
cannot now – the identical action - be enacted in the present or indeed again 
at any time at all. This is because part of what makes it the action it was is the 
fact it was enacted then as opposed to at another time. It follows, so this logic 
argues, that no action in the present can be identical with an action in from 
the past.  
Moreover, the conceptuality of past irrupting into the present implies 
that there was a time i.e. before the reality of the risen Jesus when the two 
actions were not identical. How can they be absolutely identical if it was the 
case that at one time they were not? Surely this violates the principle of the 
indiscernibility of identicals.  
This is not the right way to think of Barth on this matter. The paradox 
is resolved when we understand Barth as saying it is the numerically identical 
past action or past feature of being that comes to be in the present. To use 
language adapted from Michael Tooley’s masterful Time, Tense, and Causation 
it is a matter of ‘actuality as of a given time’ being ‘actual at another given 
time’ (Michael Tooley, Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford: OUP, 1997), chapter 
2, ‘Actuality and Actuality as of a Time’). It is in this sense a matter of 
numerical identity. It is actual in the present because Jesus enacted its 
actuality. Note Barth does not say the irruption of the action or being per se 
continues into the present; it is not a matter of sortal sameness, of sameness 
prolonging itself into the future (or from the vantage-point of the past, the 
present)! It is a matter of numerical or absolute identity: absolute identity 
11 
 
presenting itself in the present via Jesus’ enactment of sovereignty or lordship 
over time. Jesus enacts not merely the object or the event but the time of the 
object or the event recursively including the object or event. This is the sense 
in which the ‘past irrupts into the present.’ The time of the action or event is 
absolutely identical with itself except that what it was at the earlier time (the 
‘before’) – its time - is re-presented at the later time (the ‘after’). It turns out 
that the past action of feature of past being is in fact identical with the present 
action or feature of being. The intentionality is to say that its time is 
‘resurrected’ at a later time. In this sense ‘two different times are made one 
time.’14 This indeed is the primary meaning of sovereignty over time as 
opposed to mere sovereignty over events and objects in time. If this distinction 
is not possible then sovereignty of time understood in terms of numerical 
identity is not possible. I hold both to be possible. And I hold this on the 
grounds that, in the spirit of Quine, we can invoke the claim that reality 
supervenes over our notion of what is a priori possible. It seems to me it is 
possible to enact an action or an aspect of being absolutely identical with the 
past precisely because it makes sense to say of the risen Jesus that this is what 
he did.  
We must speak as Barth does of the resurrection of time itself. Only if 
Jesus is sovereign over time rather than merely sovereign over the events and 
objects that occupy time, can he be identified as God. We may indeed require 
something like Michael Tooley’s  concept of ‘actual as of a time’ to distinguish 
between an event taking place at one time as opposed to taking place at 
another. According to Barth, Jesus enacts the identical action that he enacted 
the night of his betrayal, the action that was, to use Tooley’s language, ‘actual 
at that time’ not merely generically the same action that he might have 
                                                          
14 It may mean that Saul Kripke’s seminal breakthrough to a concept of 
identity whose epistemic mode of truth was a posteriori -  a posteriori 
numerical identity - is relevant here. See Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 2nd 
edition (Oxford, Blackwell, 1982). The identity of the morning star with the 
evening star – Hesperus with Phosphorus (Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 101-
5) is a matter of spatial identity. It turns out that the planet (Venus) identified 
as the morning star and as the evening star satisfy the indiscernibility of 
identicals in terms of spatial coordinates (as well as of course in all other 
respects). The same logic transposed to the category to time applies to the 
resurrection of time. In particular, just as one could not know a priori that the 
morning star is (identical with) the evening star then so one could not know a 
priori that this action or feature of past being was in fact identical with 
present action or feature of being. But this does not preclude either being an 
expression of absolute identity.  
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enacted on another occasion when he broke bread.15 Barth also seems to imply 
that it was the fact the action was this action – this identical action from the 
past – that was crucial and necessary in eliciting recognition. Generically the 
same action could have had no such effect. Nor could sortal sameness. Joseph 
Fitzmyer made a brilliant and nuanced observation: ‘What is above all 
important is that the disciples report that they knew him “in the breaking of 
the bread” (v. 35) and not by seeing him’ (Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to 
Luke X-XXIV, [New Haven: Yale, 1985], 1569). Jesus is not recognizable other 
than in this action (absolutely) identical with the past. 
All this amounts to the fact that Barth envisaged time to be a level up 
from the existence of objects and events (as Ilya Prigogine the Nobel Prize-
winning scientist said in another context: ‘Time precedes existence’, 
Prigogine, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature [NY: 
The Free Press, chapter 8 ‘Does Time Precede Existence?’). Time was 






If I may end on a note of irony regarding Barth’s attribution of sovereignty 
over time to the Gospel of Luke. I don’t myself believe that Luke meant this. I 
do think that what Jesus did then is what Barth holds him to have done but 
that is another matter. I do think that it is feasible to say that sovereignty of 
time understood in terms of numerical identity is what John means to 
attribute to the action of Jesus that elicited Mary Magdalene’s recognition of 
him (his saying her name, “Mary”, 20:16). But that too is another matter. Barth 
claimed that the Emmaus narrative for Luke is the lens through which to 
understand all the other resurrection-appearance narratives: ‘It is surely no 
accident that Luke, the Evangelist who more than any other has the 
reputation of being a historian, records this story as an indispensable 
commentary on all the other Easter narratives’ (CD III/2, 272). I think this is 
not true. My view is that notwithstanding the utter brilliance of his exegesis 
Barth read too much into Lukan intentionality and that if sovereignty over 
                                                          
15 To be sure, Barth was less determinative in Church Dogmatics IV/2 when he 
referred to the action in Luke 24:30-31: ‘And Luke tells us that "as he sat at 
meat with them, he took bread, and blessed it, and brake, and gave to them" 
(Lk. 2430). But even to the very words and order this is exactly what had 
happened at the last supper and the earlier feeding of the five and the four 
thousand’, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 145. But it may be that he was simply 




time was anyone’s insight it was John’s. But if as I believe there is significant 
mileage in approaching the risen Jesus in terms of time understood in terms 
of a posteriori numerical identity Barth surely must be credited with being the 
first to make the breakthrough.  
In the latter part of his life Barth famously spoke of eternal life in the 
following vein: 
Eternal life is not another and second life, beyond the present one. It is 
this life, but the reverse side which God sees although it is as yet 
hidden from us—this life in its relation to what He has done for the 
whole world, and therefore for us too, in Jesus Christ. We thus wait 
and hope, even in view of our death, for our manifestation with Him, 
with Jesus Christ who was raised again from the dead, in the glory of 
not only the judgment but also the grace of God (Barth, "‘To Werner 
Rüegg’, Hombrechtikon, Zurich Canton, Basel, 6 July 1961", Karl Barth 
Letters 1961-68. Trans. Geoffrey William. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1981], 9-10). 
Barth wrote Church Dogmatics III/2 something like fifteen years before. It 
seems to me he was on to an abiding truth of the Gospel when he spoke of the 
risen Jesus being present in the form which belonged to the past. It seems to me 
that the distinctiveness of Judaeo-Christianity’s perspective on life after death 
is that it does not involve (or should not involve) the conceptuality of another 
life after this but that it should reconceive it as Barth did in terms of the 
resurrection of time past.  
 
